Suchergebnisse

Many situations in the social and economic life are characterized by rivalry and conflict between two or more competing groups. Warfare, socio-political conflicts, political elections, lobbying, and R&D competitions are all examples of inter-group conflicts in which groups spend scarce and costly resources to gain an advantage over other groups. Here, we report on an experiment that investigates the impact of political institutions within groups on the development of conflict between groups. We find that relative to the case in which group members can decide individually on their level of conflict engagement, conflict significantly intensifies when investments are determined democratically by voting or when a single group member (the dictator) can decide on behalf of the group. These results hold for both symmetric and asymmetric contests, as well as for situations in which institutions are adopted exogenously or endogenously. Our findings thus suggest that giving people the possibility to vote is not the main reason for why democracies seem to engage in less wars than autocracies. Nevertheless, when giving participants the possibility to choose which institution to adopt, we find that democracy is the by far most popular one as it combines the desirable features of autonomy and equality.

Many situations in the social and economic life are characterized by rivalry and con ict between two or more competing groups. Warfare, socio-political con icts, political elections, lobbying, and R&D competitions are all examples of inter-group con icts in which groups spend scarce and costly resources to gain an advantage over other groups. Here, we report on an experiment that investigates the impact of political institutions within groups on the development of con ict between groups. We find that relative to the case in which group members can decide individually on their level of con ict engagement, con ict significantly intensifies when investments are determined democratically by voting or when a single group member (the dictator) can decide on behalf of the group. These results hold for both symmetric and asymmetric contests, as well as for situations in which institutions are adopted exogenously or endogenously. Our findings thus suggest that giving people the possibility to vote is not the main reason for why democracies seem to engage in less wars than autocracies. Nevertheless, when giving participants the possibility to choose which institution to adopt, we find that the voting institution is the by far most popular one as it combines the desirable features of autonomy and equality.

Contents -- Contributors -- Preface -- Chapter 1. The Psychology of Cultural Contact / Deborah A. Prentice and Dale T. Miller -- Part I. The Claims of Ethnic Identity -- Chapter 2. Models of American Ethnic Relations: A Historical Perspective / George M. Fredrickson -- Chapter 3. Cultural Diversity and Multicultural Politics: Is Ethnic Balkanization Psychologically Inevitable? / David O. Sears, Jack Citrin, Sharmaine V. Cheleden, and Colette van Laar

"Dieser Aufsatz modelliert den Trade-Off zwischen Produktion und Aneignung in
Situationen, die sowohl von Konflikten innerhalb von Gruppen, als auch von
Konflikten zwischen den Gruppen gekennzeichnet sind. Das Modell beleuchtet
einen Gruppen-Kohäsions-Effekt: Wenn der Wettkampf zwischen Gruppen
schärfer wird, oder Probleme unvollständiger Verträge zwischen Gruppen
zunehmen, dann wenden die Spieler weniger Ressourcen in den internen
Konflikten auf. Außerdem gibt es auch einen umgekehrten Gruppen-Kohäsions-
Effekt: Werden die Wettkämpfe innerhalb der Gruppen weniger scharf, oder
Probleme unvollständiger Verträge innerhalb der Gruppen weniger gravierend,
dann verwenden die Spieler mehr Energie auf den Wettkampf zwischen den
Gruppen. Der Aufsatz wirft auch ein neues Licht auf normative Fragen der optimalen
Gestaltung von Organisationen. Ich leite eine exakte Bedingung her,
unter der eine Aufteilung der Individuen in mehr Gruppen zu mehr produktiven
Anstrengungen und weniger Aneignungsaktivitäten führt. Außerdem zeige ich,
dass es eine optimale Größe von Organisationen gibt, die durch simultane inter- und
intra-Gruppen Konflikte gekennzeichnet sind. Die optimale Größe bestimmt
sich durch einen Trade-Off zwischen steigenden Skalenerträgen in der
Produktion einerseits und zunehmenden Aneignungsaktivitäten andererseits." (Autorenreferat)

Jane Mansbridge (1999) challenges critics of descriptive representation, writing that it leads to improvements in substantive representation. Theorists, however, continue to debate the degree to which groups can be represented by single individuals in government as gains in descriptive representation fail to be transformative. The effects of descriptive representation are more complex than they are often presented as new descriptive representatives do not always win acceptance. Even as there are substantive policy gains through descriptive representation, there are also setbacks for groups through the mobilization of opposition groups. There is also pressure on descriptive representatives to moderate their positions and be less vocal. Given the dominant position of privileged groups and their conservative ideologies that defend inequality, substantive gains from descriptive representation are less than implied by descriptive representation advocates.